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Chapter III  
Judicial Development in Taiwan 
3.1. The Architecture of Judicial System 
The Constitution establishes that the Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ in 
charge of civil, criminal and administrative litigations, disciplinary decisions 
concerning public officials, as well as constitutional interpretations.126  Since its 
inception, however, the Judicial Yuan has not exercised directly all of its judicial 
capacities except the interpretative powers. For decades, the Judicial Yuan has served 
as a supervisory body responsible for judicial administration with the exception of the 
Council of Grand Justices. 
The heads of the Judicial Yuan, the President and Vice President, are appointed 
by President and consented by the National Assembly.127 A number of departments 
and offices are established in charge of judicial administration, personnel 
managements, the promulgation of rules and regulations concerning judicial 
procedures, and the drafts of procedural laws.  
These departments include: 1) Civil Department: mainly in charge of 
administration and management concerning civil litigation and procedures; 2) 
Criminal Department: mainly in charge of administration and management regarding 
criminal litigation and procedures; 3) the Department of Administrative Litigation and 
Public Discipline: mainly in charge of administration and management regarding 
administrative litigation and discipline procedures; 4) the Department of Judicial 
                                                 
126 See Article 77 of the ROC Constitution. 
127 Starting 2003, however, President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan will be 
consented by the Legislative Yuan, as the Constitutional Revision of 2000 suspended the 
National Assembly and its power to consent was transferred to the Legislative Yuan. 
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Administration: mainly in charge of administration and management concerning 
judicial systems, courts organization and the research of proposed judicial rules and 
regulations; 5) the Department of Teenagers and Family Affairs: mainly in charge of 
administration and management concerning special procedures and laws relating to 
teenagers and family affairs. 
Outside the Judicial Yuan, it has been the Supreme Court responsible for civil 
and criminal cases, under which two levels of lower courts are established, the 
Supreme Administrative Court for administrative litigations, and the Public 
Commission for disciplinary decisions. Thus, the present arrangement of judicial 
institutions is not entirely consistent with the original command of the Constitution, 
requiring the Judicial Yuan as an integrative, highest judicial branch. 
The existing structure of the Judicial Yuan may be illustrated in the following 
picture:  
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organs into the same roof of the Judicial Yuan have been undertaken recently. The 
details, according to which the Judicial Yuan will be remodeled, remain unresolved 
and require further consensus reached by the legal community. The key question is 
whether the Judicial Yuan will have separate tribunals, and if so, multiple or dual. A 
new Judicial Yuan with multiple tribunals in charge of civil, criminal and 
administrative litigations, disciplinary decisions and constitutional interpretations will 
be close to the existing system, thus facing fewer objections by entrenched interests. 
Yet, this rather conservative approach will create an over-sized judicial branch, 
leaving its institutional efficiency in doubt. An opposite plan will be granting the 
Judicial Yuan all kinds of jurisdictions without any specialized divisions among them. 
The new Judicial Yuan will mirror the U.S. Supreme Court and this mirroring, as 
some are convinced, was intended by the framers. Since this proposal is aggressive, it 
has been under serious attack and one important suspicion is its feasibility: whether it 
is feasible for the fifteen Grand Justices in the Judicial Yuan, who at present exercise 
only the interpretative powers,128 to fulfill all judicial responsibilities, and whether it 
is possible to decrease the number of cases for appellate review, let alone other costs. 
In the middle ground stands a moderate proposal, in which a dual system will remain 
in the Judicial Yuan, one constitutional tribunal, the other for other jurisdictions. This 
proposal seeks to preserve a specialized tribunal especially for constitutional review, 
as it is believed that based upon the European experiences, a separate constitutional 
court from the ordinary ones is pivotal to the vibrant exercise of constitutional review. 
Despite its modesty,  this proposal encounters similar criticism regarding the 
feasibility and whether a particular promotion of constitutional review is consistent 
                                                 
128 See Article 78 of the ROC Constitution, Article 5 of the Additional Articles of the ROC 
Constitution. 
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with the Constitution. 
Which proposal to choose is still to be determined, but when to choose has 
nevertheless been settled. In the Judicial Reform Conference of 1999, the consensus 
was reached that the remodeling of the Judicial Yuan must be completed by 
September of 2003. This deadline was also reaffirmed in a recent constitutional 
interpretation, in which the inconsistency between the existing judicial institutional 
arrangements and the original constitutional provisions was condemned. 129  In 
addition, the government has announced for several times that the judicial reform is 
on its high agenda and must be carried out in accordance with relevant constitutional 
demands. Despite the uncertain scale of reform, it is foreseeable that some measure of 
judicial remodeling will set forth in the fall of 2003.   
3.2. Interpretative Powers and Constitutional Review by the Council 
of Grand Justices 
The 1946 ROC Constitution specifies that the Judicial Yuan shall be responsible 
for constitutional interpretations as well as unified interpretations of laws and 
regulations. To carry out this constitutional mandate, the Council of Grand Justices 
was established as early as 1948 and has functioned since. Besides interpretative 
powers and judicial review, Grand Justices under the mandate of the 1992 
constitutional revision also form a Constitutional Court to adjudicate cases concerning 
the dissolution of political parties. 
 3.2.1. The Composition of the Council of Grand Justices 
According to the current constitutional provisions and relevant laws, the Judicial 
Yuan shall have a number of Grand Justices with a renewable term of nine years 
appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly. Since 1948, 
                                                 
129 See Interpretation No. 530 of the Grand Justices. 
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there have been six Councils. The current sixth Council of Grand Justices whose 
tenure began in 1994 will leave the office by September of 2002.  
Effective from September of 2003, as the result of the 1997 constitutional 
revision, the Judicial Yuan will have only fifteen Grand Justices (including the 
President and Vice-President of the Judicial Yuan to be selected among them) 
appointed by the President with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. More importantly, 
the tenure of Grand Justices will be non-renewable and reduced to only eight years 
and shall not be renewed. In addition, in order to rejuvenate the Council more 
frequently, eight Grand Justices including President and Vice President of the Judicial 
Yuan appointed in September 2003 shall have a shorter term of four years so that half 
of the Grand Justices will be replaced every four years since.130
The Council of Grand Justices: Its Numbers and Tenure 
 Number Tenure Renewable 
Before Sep. 2003 
(1st ~ 6th Councils) 
No More Than 
Seventeen 
Nine Years Yes 
After Sep. 2003 Fifteen Eight Years No 
The qualifications for Grand Justices have been prescribed in the Organic Law of 
the Judicial Yuan since the Council’s establishment of 1948. Grand Justices shall have 
one of the following qualifications: 
1. Having Served, with distinguished record, as a justice of the Supreme Court for 
ten years or more; 
2. Having Served, with distinguished contributions, as a member of the Legislative 
Yuan for nine years or more; 
3. Having been a professor of a major law subject at a university for ten years or 
                                                 
130 See Article 5 of the Additional Articles of the ROC Constitution. 
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more with distinguished publications; 
4. Having been a judge of the International Court of Justices, or having published an 
eminent work on public or comparative laws; or 
5. Being a person with prominent reputations for legal research and political 
experiences.   
Thus far, throughout the sixth Councils, most Grand Justices come from courts 
and universities. Almost all of the Grand Justices have had a law degree and on 
average, one third of them have a Ph.D. degree in law from abroad. The prominent 
academic record of the Council Grand Justices have attributed to its judicial 
performances. 
3.2.2. The Jurisdiction of the Council of Grand Justices 
Basically, the Council of Grand Justices have been in charge of constitutional 
review, unified legal interpretations and the dissolution of unconstitutional political 
parties. 
3.2.2.1. Centralized Constitutional Review 
The Constitution specifies that laws and rules in conflict with the Constitution 
shall be null and void. When doubts arise about whether laws and rules are in conflict 
with the Constitution, requests for interpretation shall be made exclusively to the 
Judicial Yuan, namely, the Council of Grand Justices. According to the current 
relevant laws, constitutional review by Grand Justices comes from three sources: 
institutional conflict, constitutional review in abstract, and concrete constitutional 
complaint.131
                                                 
131 The major law that governs the work of the Council of Grand Justices is the Law 
Regarding Grand Justices’ Adjudication enacted in 1993. 
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(1) Institutional Conflict 
The Council has been delegated with the power to resolve institutional conflicts 
between various branches of the national government or between national and local 
governments. Government agencies may petition for constitutional interpretations if 
they, while executing their powers, have disputes with another agencies in the 
application of the Constitution. Since 1993, one third of the legislators have been able 
to petition to the Council of Grand Justices directly. It was a huge step towards the 
protection of political minorities in the legislature and the number of constitutional 
petitions by legislators has since increased rapidly. 
(2) Abstract Constitutional Review 
Most of the constitutional cases before the Council of Grand Justices are about 
abstract constitutional review including the interpretation of constitutional provisions 
and, most importantly, the review of constitutionality of concerned laws and 
regulations. The requests for constitutional review may come from two major avenues: 
1) government agencies, including one third of legislators and courts, 2) individuals 
and political parties.  
In the first category, government agencies including local governments, courts 
and one third of the legislators may petition to the Council of Grand Justices if they 
have doubts in the application of the Constitution or have suspicions about the 
constitutionality of concerned laws and rules. 
The second category is about constitutional review requested by individuals or 
political parties. These requests, unlike the first category by government agencies, 
cannot be made directly without prior proceedings. Before individuals petition to the 
Council of Grand Justice to review the constitutionality of concerned laws and 
regulations resulting in the infringements of their protected rights, they must exhaust 
legal remedies and procedures. Also, because of the abstract nature of constitutional 
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review, the Council of Grand Justices cannot review facts in individual cases, nor can 
it render any direct remedies. What the Council is authorized to examine in these 
individual petitions is merely the constitutionality of the challenged laws and rules.  
(3) Concrete Constitutional Complaint 
While the current constitutional provisions and laws have not specified the 
availability of concrete constitutional complaint, one constitutional interpretation 
rendered by the Council of Grand Justices, Interpretation No. 371, has opened this 
avenue since 1994. To guarantee the protection of constitutional rights, the Council of 
Grand Justices has permitted individual judges to file constitutional petitions if they 
are convinced that the laws and rules they must apply in concrete cases are 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Before making such a petition, judges must 
suspend the proceedings and will not reopen it until receiving the constitutional 
interpretations by the Council. 
3.2.2.2. Unified Legal Interpretations 
The Constitution delegates the power to unify the interpretations of laws and 
rules to the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan. The requests for unified legal 
interpretations may come from two resources: 1) government agencies, including 
courts, 2) individuals and political parties. 
The first category has been the major source of Grand Justices’ unified legal 
interpretations. If government agencies, while executing their duties, have found that 
their interpretations of concerned laws and regulations are in conflict with other 
agencies’ interpretations, they may file the requests to the Council for unified legal 
interpretations. It is not applicable, however, if the interpretations made by certain 
agencies must be binding to their subordinated agencies. 
Since 1993, the second category, individual request for unified legal 
interpretation, has been added. Individual may petition to the Council for unified legal 
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interpretations if they find that the interpretations and applications of the law and 
rules in their final proceedings are inconsistent with those of other cases concerning 
the same laws and rules, and such differences amount to the infringement of their 
constitutionally protected rights. 
While the expansion of unified legal interpretations to individual cases has 
facilitated the protection of constitutional rights, the certainty of legal interpretations 
and applications in concrete cases is nevertheless hampered. To strike a balance, 
individual petition for unified legal interpretations may not be granted unless it is 
brought to the Council of Grand Justices no later than three months after their cases 
become final.132
3.2.2.3. Dissolution of Political Parties 
The Constitution prescribes that a political party shall be declared as 
unconstitutional if its purpose or its activities endanger the existence of the state or 
democratic constitutional order. The power to declare political parties unconstitutional 
and further dissolve them is granted the Constitutional Court formed by Grand 
Justices.133
The Constitutional Court shall conduct oral proceedings with the presence of 
three-fourths or more of the total number of the Grand Justices. A judgment to 
dissolve a political party may be rendered only with the concurrence of two-thirds of 
the Grand Justices present at the oral arguments. If the concurrence is not reached, a 
judgment of non-dissolution shall therefore be entered. 
3.2.3. The Adjudicative Procedures of the Council of Grand Justices 
After a petition enters into the Council, a panel consisting of three Grand Justices 
                                                 
132 See Article 7 of the Law Regarding Grand Justices’ Adjudication of 1993. 
133 See Article 5 of the Additional Articles of the ROC Constitution. 
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will render the initial review. This panel will either dismiss the case if it fails to meet 
procedural requirements or draft substantive opinions on its merits. The suggestion of 
either dismissal or granting review, in the name of the said panel, is then submitted to 
the regular session of the Council of Grand Justices for further discussion. Grand 
Justices meet three times per week on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and plenary 
sessions are held every other Friday morning, in which interpretations are voted and 
announced. Currently, President of the Judicial Yuan, who is not Grand Justice, 
presides over the plenary sessions without the power to case votes. 
According to the Grand Justices’ Adjudication Law, constitutional interpretations 
shall be made with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Grand Justices present at the 
meeting having a quorum of two-thirds of the total number of the Grand Justices. If it 
is about the unconstitutionality of concerned rules and regulations or the unification of 
legal interpretations, the quorum is lessened to the concurrence of more than one half 
of the Grand Justices present at the meeting having a quorum of more than one half of 
the total number of the Grand Justices. Dissenting or concurring justices have been 
permitted to issue separate opinions published together with the majority’s 
interpretations. 
 
The Quorum of Decisions By the Council of Grand Justices 
 Constitutional 
Interpretations/ 
Unconstitutional 
Ruling of Laws 
Unconstitutional 
Ruling of 
Regulations 
Unified Legal 
Interpretations 
Dissolution of 
Unconstitutional 
Political Parties 
Meeting 
Quorum  
Two-Thirds One-Half One-Half Three-Fourth 
Decision 
Quorum 
Two-Thirds One-Half One-Half Two-Thirds 
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Most of the time, the Council of Grand Justices consider and deliberate cases 
without opening any oral arguments. Grand Justices may, however, upon request or ex 
officio, summon the petitioners, their counselors, interested parties concerned or 
government agencies concerned to present their opinions or conduct investigations. 
Since the enactment of the 1993 Law Regarding Grand Justices’ Adjudication Law, 
oral arguments may be held in the constitutional courtroom, whenever Grand Justices 
find necessary.  
The first oral argument took place on December 23, 1993, with respect to 
Interpretation No. 334, in which the Executive and Legislative branches conflicted 
over whether government funds exceeded the statutory limits.134 The Council has 
since continued to hold numerous oral arguments concerning cases of constitutional 
significance. For example, Interpretation No. 391 involving a dispute as to whether 
prosecutors, but not judges, may retain the power to detain suspects, 135  or 
Interpretation No. 419 involving whether the Vice President may concurrently hold 
the office of the Premier.136
3.2.4. The Binding Effect of Interpretations by Grand Justices 
The ruling of the Council of Grand Justices is binding to all of the concerned 
government agencies and individuals and become part of constitutional norms. 
Notably, after the enactment of the 1993 Grand Justices’ Adjudication Law, the 
Council has been granted with the power to execute the interpretations by directing 
the concerned agencies to take prompt actions.137
                                                 
134 Interpretation No. 334 was rendered on January 14, 1994. 
135 See Interpretation No. 392 (December 22, 1995). 
136 See Interpretation No. 419 (December 31, 1996). 
137 See Section 2, Article 17 of the 1993 Adjudication Law. 
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3.2.4.1. (Un) Constitutional Rulings 
As noted earlier, however, the Council of Grand Justices renders constitutional 
review in abstract and its rulings have not been directly applicable to individual cases. 
This would certainly reduce the willingness of individuals to file constitutional 
interpretations, as the result of unconstitutional ruling could not have any effect on 
their settled cases. To solve this problem, the Council has allowed certain retrials for 
individuals who successfully challenged the constitutionality or interpretations of 
concerned laws and rules.138       
3.2.4.2. Judicial Deadlines 
Besides constitutional or unconstitutional rulings, the Council of Grand Justices 
has employed a distinctive form of constitutional ruling: the imposition of judicial 
deadline. In this way of judicial ruling, while the Council reached the conclusion of 
unconstitutionality of the challenged laws and rules, it stopped short of nullifying it 
immediately. Instead, Grand Justices set up a deadline, a period of six months, a year, 
or two years and make it clear that the unconstitutional laws or regulations will not 
become void until that date. The first judicial deadline imposed was in Interpretation 
No. 218, in which a tax standard remained valid for more than six months after it was 
found unconstitutional.139  
This strategy – declaring laws unconstitutional but not void until a set deadline in 
order to resolve legal uncertainties that might arise from instant nullification – has not 
been uncommon in comparative constitutional practices.140 Yet, some have been 
                                                 
138 See Interpretation No 177. 
139 See Interpretation No. 218 (August 14, 1987). See also Lawrence Shao-Liang Liu, supra 
note 84. 
140 For example, the German Constitutional Court has long employed this strategy in order to 
give enough time for corrective legislative action to take place and on occasion to direct 
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concerned political impacts and legal consistencies underlying this strategy. 
3.2.4.3. Judicial Warnings 
Sometimes, when the Council of Grand Justices upholds the constitutionality of 
challenged laws and regulations, it will issue a judicial warning of the potential 
unconstitutionality. Again, this has not been rare in comparative constitutional 
practices. The German Constitutional Court, for example, has from time to time 
exercised this type of ruling with a great deal of judicial precaution.141 The first case 
where the Council issued such warning was Interpretation No. 211.142 Since then, the 
Council has been inclined to employ this form of constitutional rulings when it has 
not entered the certainty of unconstitutionality of challenged laws and rules. 
3.2.5. The Achievement of the Council of Grand Justices 
3.2.5.1 The Incremental Development of the Council 
Since its inception in 1948, there have been six Councils, who have together 
                                                                                                                                            
parliament to adopt a specific solution. In the latter case, the Court is also likely to lay 
down general guidelines for the parliament to consider new legislation before the set 
deadline. See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, at 52-4. 
141 See Donald P. Kommers, id, at 53-4. 
142 See Interpretation No. 211 (December 5, 1986). The case concerned a law involving 
customs and anti-smuggling. The law required suspected smugglers to provide with a large 
amount of bail bond before they could appeal to courts. If they failed to do so, their appeals 
would be dismissed automatically. Clearly, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, this 
measure seemingly overburdened petitioners and unreasonably hampered rights to sue and 
to be heard in courts guaranteed by Article 16 of the ROC Constitution. To sustain this law, 
therefore, the Council put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of the anti-smuggling 
policy that could outweigh the protection of right to sue. Grand Justices also reminded the 
administrative agency to exercise appropriate discretion given by the law to enforce such 
stringent measures. In the end, however, the Council warned that this law, while 
legitimately pursuing anti-smuggling public policy, might need an overhaul to take 
suspects’ right to sue more into account. 
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rendered more than 550 cases by the end of 2002. More importantly, the last decade 
witnessed an extraordinary success of the exercise of judicial power by the Council of 
Grand Justices. 
 First 
Council 
1948-1958 
Second 
Council 
1958-1967
Third 
Council 
1967-1976
Fourth 
Council 
1976-1985
Fifth 
Council 
1985-1994 
Sixth 
Council 
1994-2002
Total Cases 
Rendered 
(Cases Petitioned) 
 
79 
(658) 
43 
(355) 
24 
 (446) 
53 
 (1145) 
167 
(2702) 
176 
(N/A) 
Constitutional 
Interpretations 
(Petitioned) 
 
25 
(51) 
8 
(45) 
2 
(75) 
32 
(544) 
149 
(1846) 
170 
(N/A) 
Unified Legal 
Interpretations 
(Petitioned) 
 
54 
(607) 
35 
(310) 
22 
(371) 
21 
(601) 
18 
(856) 
6 
(N/A) 
 
3.2.5.2. The Particular Roles of the Council during the Democratization and 
Constitutional Reforms 
There has been no doubt that the Council of Grand Justices has attributed greatly 
to political transitions and constitutional reforms.143 As the following Figure shows, 
                                                 
143 See Lawrence Shao-Liang Liu, Judicial Review and Emerging Constitutionalism: The 
Uneasy Case for the Republic of China on Taiwan, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 509 (1991); Fraser 
Mendel, Judicial Power & Illusion: The Republic of China’s Council of Grand Justices and 
Constitutional Interpretations, 2 PACIFIC. RIM. L. & POL. J. 157 (1993); Tsung-Fu Chen, 
Judicial Review and Social Change in Post-war Taiwan 205 (1996) (unpublished JSD 
dissertation, New York University, School of Law) (on file with author); Jiunn-rong Yeh, 
Constitutional Changes, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law in Taiwan: The Role of 
Council of Grand Justices, paper presented for the Conference on “Transitional Societies in 
Comparison: East Europe vs. Taiwan” in Prague, May 27-29, 1999 (on file with the author); 
Sean Cooney, A Community Changes: Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices and Liberal 
Democratic Reform, in Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia: The Rule of Law and Legal 
Institutions 253-80 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed. 1999); Thomas Benjamin Ginsburg, Growing 
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the first four Councils in almost four decade rendered only five cases where the 
challenged rules declared inconsistent with the Constitution. In sharp contrast, the 
fifth Council alone annulled suspected laws and regulations in 42 cases.  
Similarly, the current sixth Council, by the end of 2000, has proved itself to be 
progressive and active. Since 1994, this prolific Council has invalidated 
unconstitutional laws and regulations in more than 53 cases and it annually rendered 
about 30 cases. The ratio of the Council’s judicial invalidation of statutes and rules 
has been as high as 40 percent.144
 
 
 
 First 
Council 
1948-1958 
Second 
Council 
1958-1967
Third 
Council 
1967-1976
Fourth 
Council 
1976-1985
Fifth 
Council 
1985-1994 
Sixth 
Council 
1994-2000
Total Cases 
Rendered 
(Petitioned) 
79 
 
(658) 
43 
 
(355) 
24 
 
(446) 
53 
 
(1145) 
167 
 
(2702) 
153 
 
(1606) 
Declaring laws 
or Regulations 
Unconstitutional 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
 
42 
 
56 
 
The reason for the judicial activism displayed by the recent Council of Grand 
Justices is related to its roles during the Taiwan’s democratization in the early 1990s 
and succeeding constitutional reforms. While the legitimating judicial role often 
occurs in the initial stage of democratization, judicial roles as either coordinator in 
resolving constitutional inconsistencies or institutional conflicts generated by 
incremental constitutional reforms or protector in ensuring the rule of law and 
                                                                                                                                            
Constitutions: Judicial Review in the New Democracies (Korea, Taiwan, China, Mongolia) 
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1999) (on file with the 
library of the University of California, Berkeley). 
144 For more details, see Wen-Chen Chang, supra. 
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defending human rights last after democratization is completed and well into the later 
stage of democratic consolidation. 
(1) Judicial Role as Legitimating 
One of the most conspicuous cases that exemplified its judicial legitimating role 
was Interpretation No. 261.145 After the death of Chiang Ching-Kuo that derailed the 
Nationalist Party-State in the late 1980s, one of the most immediate steps towards 
democratization was to reform the national representative institutions, whose senior 
members had held their seats without re-election since 1947-48. Paradoxically 
however, the institutionalized legitimacy of Lee Teng-Hui was conferred precisely 
from these old institutions. Recognizing the constraints of his political legitimacy 
vested by the backward legality, Lee Teng-Hui still pledged to reform. But the real 
question was how to achieve this goal.  
Thanks to the reforming alliance of reform-minded nationalists and DPP 
moderates, a petition regarding the constitutionality of the indefinitely prolonged 
tenure held by the first-term delegates in the national representative institutions was 
brought to the Court, the fifth Council of Grand Justices.146 This petition challenged 
Interpretation No. 31, among other things, rendered by the first Council of Grand 
Justices in 1954, which allowed these senior members to continue to serve in office 
until the second-term representatives could be duly elected.147
Amidst political chaos, on June 21, 1990, the Court handed down Interpretation 
No. 261, the most critical constitutional interpretations indispensable to the 
                                                 
145 Interpretation No. 261 (June 21, 1990). For more details, see Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 
5, at 354-68. 
146 See the Affidavit of the Legislative Yuan in Interpretation No. 261 (June 21, 1990). 
147 See id. 
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continuous process of the constitutional transformation in Taiwan.148 To the surprise 
of everyone, the Council with its full constitutional authority ordered the first-term 
members in all three national elective offices who had continually served in office 
since 1947-48 or 1969149 without running for re-election to leave office by December 
31, 1991.  
Moreover, it dictated that the national government must hold a national election 
promptly for the second-term representatives in a manner consistent with the ROC 
Constitution, the Council’s interpretation, and the relevant laws.150 Much attention, 
however, has been focused on the deadline for all senior members to leave office 
imposed by the Court. This deadline, the end of 1991, was precisely the same time 
period as that which President Lee Teng-Hui announced earlier in some political 
situations. Thus, many political scientists as well as legal scholars have read this 
interpretation as merely rendering constitutional legitimacy and assigning legality to a 
previously determined political decision.151
                                                 
148 See JOHN F. COPPER, TAIWAN’S MID-1990S ELECTIONS: TAKING THE FINAL STEPS TO 
DEMOCRACY 13 (1998) (stating that Taiwan’s systemic reform was fostered by court 
rulings.); Juergen Domes, The Kuomintang and the Opposition, in IN THE SHADOW OF 
CHINA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN SINCE 1949 128 (Steve Tsang ed. 1993); 
Hung-mao Tien, Taiwan’s Evolution toward Democracy: A Historical Perspective, in 
TAIWAN: BEYOND THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE 3-23, 7-8 (Denis Fred Simon & Michael Y.M. 
Kau eds. 1992). 
149 Note that according to the 1966 Temporary Provisions, the supplementary delegates 
elected in 1969 were not subject to reelections. It was only after the promulgation of the 
1972 Temporary Provisions that additional delegates were subject to reelections. See supra 
note. The number of delegates elected in the 1969 supplementary elections was about a 
dozen. See supra note 86. 
150 See Interpretation No. 261 (June 21, 1990).. 
151 For the view of political scientists, see Chia-lung Lin, supra note 16, at 323-4. For the 
view of legal scholars, see Jau-Yuan Hwang, Constitutional Change and Political Transition 
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The constitutional significance of Interpretation No. 261, however, was that the 
Grand Justices ordered, with its full authority as well as legitimating functions, the 
senior members of the national representative bodies to leave office by the end of 
1991 and demanded that the election of second-term representatives take place, 
thereby ending the undemocratic representation of more than four decades. 
(2) Judicial Role as Coordinating 
The second salient role that the Taiwanese Constitutional Court played in the 
recent decade of democratic transitions and constitutional reforms was serving as a 
coordinating arbiter in resolving political conflicts and institutional gridlock. 
Negotiated democratization and the incremental constitutional reforms it generated as 
a result of political compromises have engendered a great deal of incoherence, if not 
contradictions, in the constitutional text and thus needed interpretations to be 
stabilized. 
 One illustrative case was Interpretation No. 325, a clash between the 
Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. This case was invoked because of the 
re-characterization of the Control Yuan. After the 1992 Constitutional Revisions, 
members of the Control Yuan were no longer elected and its power of consent was 
removed. Yet, at the same time, the Control Yuan’s powers of impeachment, censure, 
and auditing remained intact. Therefore, the far-reaching power to inspect 
administrative agencies and to issue requests to them for documents was still held by 
the Control Yuan. The Legislative Yuan was not granted such powers. 
The institution of the Control Yuan was founded upon Sun Yat-Sen’s unique 
political theory. Yet, the establishment of the Control Yuan clashed with the 
                                                                                                                                            
in Taiwan since 1986 – The Role of Legal Institutions 147 (1995) (unpublished SJD 
Dissertation, Harvard Law School). 
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contemporary constitutional system, in which the Legislative Yuan, but not the 
Control Yuan, would be vested with the powers of inspection, oversight, and 
impeachment. During the authoritarian era, the legislators seldom complained about 
the insufficiency of their powers, as most political powers were held exclusively in 
the hands of the strongman. This was no longer the case with a renewed, fully elected 
Legislative Yuan after the democratization. They argued that after the 1992 
Constitutional Revisions redefining the Control Yuan as a quasi-judicial body, the 
power to inspect administrative agencies and to issue requests for documents should 
be transferred to the Legislative Yuan.152  
The Court, struggling with the original text of the Constitution and the newly 
revised provisions, however, decided not to endorse entirely the assertion held by the 
legislators. In the lengthy ruling of Interpretation No. 325, the Court first recognized 
that as a result of the recent constitutional revisions, the Control Yuan was no longer a 
representative body. Yet, at the same time, the Court noticed that besides the revised 
provision indicating that the Control Yuan’s members were no longer elected, its 
powers of inspection, censure and impeachment remained intact. Due to the small 
scale of constitutional revisions, the Court concluded that the original structure of the 
government system adopted by the Constitution was not altered, and that the revision 
did not transfer explicitly or implicitly the power held by the Control Yuan to the 
Legislative Yuan. Thus, the Control Yuan retained all the powers previously vested to 
it by the Constitution.153
Nevertheless, the Court argued that in order to promptly perform its 
constitutional function as a representative body, it was entirely permissible for the 
                                                 
152 See the Affidavit of Interpretation No. 325 (July 23, 1993). 
153 See Interpretation No. 325 (July 23, 1993). 
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Legislative Yuan to exercise the power to request government agencies for documents 
and for that matter, to execute inspections. To anchor the ruling on textual grounds, 
the Council noted some articles in the original constitutional text. These provisions, as 
the Court contented, have been designed to give the Legislative Yuan sufficient tools 
to gather the information needed for its legislative functions. In addition, and this is 
what makes this interpretation radical, the Council affirmed that the Legislative Yuan 
may issue orders, by resolutions of the entire Yuan or various committees, to request 
government agencies for relevant documents and government agencies cannot refuse 
such requests except by due process. 
It is clear that Interpretation No. 325 was a constitutional interpretation triggered 
by incremental, small-scale constitutional reforms. As incremental constitutional 
reforms often obfuscated rather than delineated the intricate power allocations in the 
Constitution, they may unintentionally empower the judiciary as the constitutional 
arbiter. 
In addition to Interpretation No. 325, Interpretation No. 387 also exemplified a 
salient case of judicial coordination of constitutional revisions. Ever since democratic 
transitions and constitutional reforms were undertaken in the early 1990s, 
constitutional politics in Taiwan was played in great vigor. When the newly elected 
Legislative Yuan was inaugurated in February 1993, its members made an 
unprecedented request for the resignation of the Premier, the President of the 
Executive Yuan. They argued that the government system structured in the 
Constitution is parliamentary, and that accordingly, as a new legislature is assembled, 
the Premier must resign in order for the new legislature to have a chance to affect the 
administration. The Premier resisted, however, based upon the fact that he was 
appointed by the President and as the President had not been reelected or asked him to 
resign, he had no constitutional duty to resign simply because a new legislature was 
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assembled. Besides, there was no precedent for such an action. This resulted in the 
serious political gridlock between the Executive and Legislative Yuans and was 
brought to the Constitutional Court for constitutional solutions.  
The sixth Council of Grand Justices made a bold statement in Interpretation No. 
387.154 The Court endorsed fully the parliamentary system as the government system 
embedded in the original constitutional text despite the fact that the most recent 
constitutional revision of 1994 changed the presidency to be directly elected by the 
people with certain political consensus of moving the parliamentary system into 
presidential or semi-presidential system. The Court held that based on the principles 
of democracy and responsibility, the President of the Executive Yuan, the Premier, 
must submit his/her resignation to the President, at the conclusion of the term of office 
of the existing legislature and no later than the first convocation of the new 
legislature.155 While Interpretation No. 387 was abided, it has moved fast forward 
constitutional revisions on government system, political players, nationalists and the 
opposition alike, favored a presidential or semi-presidential system.156
(3) Judicial Role as Guarding Human Rights 
Finally, the most salient role displayed by the Council of Grand Justices has been 
the guardian of human rights with a particular emphasis on the rule of law. 
For example, in a landmark decision, Interpretation No. 313, the Court 
articulated thoroughly what it considered to be one of the most fundamental principles 
of the rule of law, the non-delegation doctrine.157 The Grand Justices stressed that 
                                                 
154 See Interpretation No. 387 (October 13, 1995). 
155 See id. 
156 Despite the resistance of the Constitutional Court. The 1997 Constitutional Revisions were 
thus passed to grant more powers to the President. 
157 See Interpretation No. 312 (February 12, 1993). In this case, fourteen airline companies 
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according to Article 23 of the Constitution, fundamental rights must not be restricted 
except by law or by administrative rules with a clearly, specifically prescribed 
statutory authorization. 158  As far as the Council was concerned, while certain 
legislative delegation might be permissible, the purpose, scope, and content of such 
delegation must be clearly and specifically detailed and prescribed in the law. 
Moreover, it would be constitutionally impermissible if regulatory rules placed any 
restrictions upon vested rights, not intended or specifically delegated by the law.  
With regard to the protection of human rights, the Court achieved an even more 
promising record. In Interpretation No. 275, for example, in nullifying a judicial 
precedent, the Court insisted that citizens must not be subject to administrative fines 
or other forms of punishment unless they are intentionally or negligently in violation 
of administrative regulations. In other words, a mere violation of regulatory rules 
should not amount to any punishment.159 The Court also began to exercise strict 
scrutiny in order to protect the rights of property and entitlements,160 privacy,161 free 
                                                                                                                                            
protested against a rule enacted by the Ministry of Transportation that fined airline 
companies if they provided aircraft services for passengers who did not have an entry visa. 
The Council decided in favor of the airlines companies holding that the conditions and the 
amount of fines imposed on the defiance of administrative duties must be prescribed by law. 
Even if the law granted the administrative agency to make a rule, the content and scope of 
that delegation must be clear and specific. 
158 The Council has repeatedly cited Article 23 of the ROC Constitution as the constitutional 
source of the principle of the rule of law and the non-delegation doctrine. Article 23 
prescribes that all the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Article shall not be 
restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of 
other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public 
welfare. 
159 See Interpretation No. 275 (March 8, 1991). 
160 See Interpretation No. 274 (February 22, 1991), Interpretation No. 280 (June 14, 1991), 
Interpretation No. 291 (February 28, 1992), Interpretation No. 316 (May 7, 1993), 
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press and publication,162 personal freedom and due process,163 and the rights to sue164 
and to hold public offices.165
Another examples of constitutional interpretations that have secured human 
rights protection rendered by Grand Justices are Interpretations No. 384 & No. 392. 
These two interpretations are involved with the protection of personal freedom and 
one of the most important constitutional principles, due process of law. They have 
made it possible the revision of relevant provisions in both the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the Statute Governing the Prevention of Gangster such that any future 
restrictions on personal freedom would be consistent with the principle of due process 
of law.  
Furthermore, Interpretation No. 471 made it explicit that the punishment of 
forced labor must be prescribed in proportionality to the extents of severity of crimes 
in order to meet with the principle of substantive due process of law and against cruel 
or unusual punishment. Interpretation No. 523 required that the condition for police 
detention be prescribed specifically in the laws in order to further secure the 
protection of personal freedom. Regarding wrongful imprisonment, interpretation No. 
478 broadened the scope of the compensation for such human rights infringement. 
These constitutional interpretations demonstrate clearly Grand Justices’ great 
                                                                                                                                            
Interpretation No. 318 (May 21, 1993), and Interpretation No. 320 (June 18, 1993). 
161 See Interpretation No. 293 (March 13, 1992). 
162 See Interpretation No. 294 (March 13, 1992). 
163 See Interpretation No. 300 (July 17, 1992). 
164 See Interpretation No. 288 (December 13, 1991), Interpretation No. 321 (June 18, 1993). 
Similar to Interpretation No. 224 rendered in 1988, the Council repeatedly struck down tax 
regulations that restricted people’s right to appeal with bonds deposited as unconstitutional. 
For other kinds of protection such as right to sue, see Interpretation No. 306 (October 16, 
1992). 
165 See Interpretation No. 283 (August 6, 1991). 
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concerns about the protection of personal freedom. 
3.2.5.3. The Prospective Reform of the Council 
As noted before, the judicial reform is expected to take place by September 2003 
despite the fact that the details of the proposals have not yet certain. Whether the 
future Judicial Yuan would be further divided into separate divisions, one of which is 
responsible for constitutional interpretation is going to affect the function of the 
Grand Justices. It is at least the consensus in the legal community that regardless of 
the organizational form, the function of judicial review successfully exercised thus far 
by the Council of Grand Justices must not only be preserved but also be reinforced.  
3.3. Recent Judicial Reforms of Other Jurisdictions 
In addition to the constitutional reviewed exercised by the Council of Grand 
Justices, other jurisdictions by the Administrative Court and Supreme Court have also 
undertaken a number of critical reforming measures. 
3.3.1. The Expansion of Administrative Litigations 
The purpose of administrative litigation is to review the lawfulness of 
government actions, and in so doing, the Administrative Court has been given the 
power to review and renounce administrative actions. 
Since July 1, 2000, the High Administrative Courts have been added to the 
Supreme Administrative Court, originally the only Administrative Court, thereby 
increasing a level of trial in administrative proceedings and providing the people with 
one more layer of review. In addition, the scope of litigation in administrative 
proceedings has also been enlarged. For instance, individuals now may sue the 
government not only for certain wrongful or unlawful actions but also for no action or 
government’s failure in providing certain actions. In this aspect, administrative 
litigation has been made greater progress in Taiwan than in Japan, as the later has not 
 104
expanded litigation scope to such an extent. 
3.3.2. The Improvement of Civil Proceedings 
In order to tackle the problems of often delayed proceedings in civil litigation, it 
has been reformed that both plaintiff and defendant now have to now review one 
another’s litigation files prior to trial to determine the contended issues that are critical 
to the decisions. Issues that fail to be raised in preparatory proceedings cannot be 
argued in the succeeding proceedings in the courts. Judges must review these 
contended issues and make certain clarifications prior to trial. The purpose of 
concentration of trials is to save significantly time spent in the trails as well as to 
improve judicial efficiency. 
Alternative disputed resolution such as mediation has been experimented recently. 
At the level of District Court, mediation has been employed as one means of 
alternative dispute resolutions. Mediation works well when arbitrators chosen from 
the communities are trusted and skilled. Therefore, the efforts have been put into the 
training of qualified arbitrators as well as the encouragement of the employment of 
mediation in resolving disputes. 
3.3.3. The Expedition of Criminal Proceedings 
With a steady increase in criminal cases, it is critical to the allocation of judicial 
resources to expedite, while taken due consideration of fairness and justice, criminal 
proceedings. Thus, the expanded use of summery judgments in misdemeanor cases 
will expedite the process of resolution. 
In July 1999, one of the consensuses reached in the National Conference for 
Judicial Reform was adopting the plea-bargain system, derived from similar examples 
set by the United States and Germany. Should the plea-bargain system be adopted, 
Article 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will have to be revised accordingly. 
Defendants who committed misdemeanors that fall under Article 376 will be eligible 
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for plea bargaining if they admit to guilt either during the investigation or prior to the 
end of trails in the district courts. Courts thus can negotiate with the defendants or 
their attorneys to reach the kinds and degrees of punishment. The introduction of the 
plea-bargain system is now awaiting the legislative approval in the Legislative Yuan. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The function of judicial system in Taiwan has been regarded as a success. One of 
the most salient achievements has been the persistent constitutional review exercised 
by the Council of Grand Justices. During the democratic transition and succeeding 
constitutional reforms, the Grand Justices have rendered interpretations to make 
certain constitutionalism and the rule of law in practice. Recently, judicial reform on 
an even larger scale has been put on the government’s high agenda. While the details 
have not yet been settled, the determination for reform is not in any doubts. It is hoped 
that after September of 2003, a remodeled Judicial Yuan will better serve as a judicial 
engine for the full embodiment of constitutionalism and rule of law in the new 
democratic Taiwan.  
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